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I.  Introduction
This paper is designed to explore the premise that less developed countries are less sophisticated 
negotiators and overly susceptible to the pressures of vast economic powers like the United 
States or the European Union (EU).1 To test the viability of this premise, this paper uses a case 
study comparing a less developed country’s negotiations with such an economic power and a 
developed country’s negotiations with the same economic power by comparing Chile and 
Australia’s recently successful completion of bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations 
with the United States. This case study will evaluate the historical and socio-economic 
conditions in both countries and how they may have impacted the respective countries’ 
negotiations. In so doing, the results may show that less developed countries are not nearly as 
unsophisticated as commentators make them out to be.
Additionally, such a case study may provide insights into other theories. Specifically, it may 
indicate whether multilateral or bilateral treaty negotiations are the more equitable forum for 
negotiating the metes and bounds of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Related to this 
determination is the question of whether Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) should be 
involved in IPR related negotiations between less developed countries and developed countries 
in an attempt to make such negotiations more equitable.2
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1 See,  e.g., Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1058-60 (2004); Peter 
Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public Hope, 592 
ANNALS 18 (2004).
2 See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protestors into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective 
Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 937, 987 (2003) (“NGOs can put a human face 
on the WTO. However, like the humans the NGOs represent, they need to be included.”); but see Hasmy Agam, 
Working With NGOs: A Developing World Perspective,  13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 42 (2002) 
(“Indeed, some NGOs in developing countries have assumed the attributes or functions of opposition political 
parties, without the responsibility and accountability of a political party. Although operating with virtual impunity, 
they expect governments to unquestioningly accept their criticisms and meekly accede to their demands.”); Gregory 
F. Jacob, Perspectives: Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 297 (2004) 
(…NGOs exert tremendous influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right 
on matters of substance, but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services 
available to delegates with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly 
did not act as disinterested legal advisers, and along the way more than one delegation was 
hoodwinked into believing the NGOs' all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.); 
2Recently, the United States of America has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Chile and 
Australia that will greatly impact the intellectual property regimes of both Australia and Chile. 
For example, Chile and Australia are both required to essentially pass a form of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright and Performances and Phonograms 
Treaties and provide greater rights to other intellectual property, like trademarks.3 While the U.S. 
implementation of these treaties resulted in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), it 
may not be necessary for these countries to create such stringent laws to meet the terms of these 
treaties.4 However, prior to the execution of these FTAs, these countries were unwilling to 
implement the WIPO treaties because of their concerns with enacting intellectual property laws 
that could be detrimental to their citizens’ well being.5
The expansion of IPRs through multilateral or bilateral treaties is a substantial concern for many 
commentators and activists who feel intellectual property rights have expanded to the detriment 
of “less sophisticated” signatories of such treaties.6 However, recent developments have shown 
that less developed countries are not necessarily as unsophisticated as originally thought.7
The results of this case study and how they relate to these topics are discussed more fully below. 
Section II of this paper provides background on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, the 
bureaucratic systems created by such agreements, and the implications these systems have on 
intellectual property rights and intellectual property law development. Sections III and IV are a 
case study of Chile and Australia that provide historical, socio-economic, and political 
background for both countries. Moreover, each section explores the negotiation process used in 
see generally, Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Analyzing TRIPS Participatory Guarantees in Light of 
Protected Indigenous Rights, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 671 (Sept. 2004).
3 See Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/outcomes/08_intellectual_property.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005) and Robin D. Gross, Chile-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on Circumvention of Technological 
Protection Measures (TPMs) that Control Copyrighted Works, (Sept. 1, 2004), 
http://www.ipjustice.org/Chile_US_FTA.shtml# (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
4 Robin D. Gross, Chile-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on Circumvention of Technological Protection Measures 
(TPMs) that Control Copyrighted Works, (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.ipjustice.org/Chile_US_FTA.shtml# (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
5
 AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media – Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement,
http://austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
6 See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 819 (2003); Peter Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of 
Hope: Trading in Public Hope, 592 ANNALS 18 (2004); see generally IP Justice, available at: 
http://www.ipjustice.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Lawrence Lessig, Lessig Blog, http://www.lessig.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
7
 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New  Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2004) ([Developing countries and NGOs] use regime shifting to 
maximize desired policy outcomes, to relieve pressure for acting in other international venues, to create treaties and 
soft law in tension with TRIPS, and to lay the political groundwork needed to integrate new principles, norm, and 
rules of intellectual property protection into the WTO and WIPO.).
3making a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Section V evaluates the findings of this case study, 
exploring the similarities and differences found in each country’s negotiation strategy, and 
rationale behind accepting the terms of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Further, it explores 
the implications this case study may have on various theories commentators have developed in 
connection with intellectual property law evolution and free trade agreements. 
II. International Intellectual Property Agreements, & Resulting Bureaucratic Structure
Countries that are net exporters of technology and copyright products created a new strategy to 
expand the scope of IPRs attributable to these products.8 The lead exporter of technology and 
copyright products, the United States, started to implement this strategy in the mid 1990’s.9 The 
strategy revolved around three sometimes overlapping concepts, the first being the creation of 
effective dispute settlement for substantive intellectual property rights, the second being the 
expansion of the definition of investment to include intellectual property rights, and the third 
being the non-violation complaint alleging nullification or impairment of benefits.10
In 1994, this strategy was implemented successfully when the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect.11  It was later expanded to all the members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, when the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into force and required all WTO members to provide 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection.12 Since these two agreements were 
signed, various bilateral and other multilateral agreements and negotiations have taken place 
8 See Allen Z. Hertz, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited: 
Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investor Protection Agreements, and at the World Trade 
Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 261-62 (1997) 
([C]ountries which are net exporters of technology and copyright product now see optimal IP 
protection in the shape of a trident. The centre prong is effective dispute settlement for the 
substantive intellectual property rights (IPRs) in NAFTA, TRIPS, the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. The left prong is made up of the investment disciplines set out in NAFTA, the 
Energy Charter Treaty, a possible Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and a growing 
network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Foreign Investment Protection Agreements 
(FIPAs), all of which define ‘investment’ as implicitly or explicitly including IPRs. The right 
prong is the non-violation complaint alleging nullification or impairment of benefits, first fully 
elaborated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) and now incorporated 
in both NAFTA and the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes.).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 265 (“For international IP protection a new era began with the entry into force on January 1, 1994 for 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico of the NAFTA”)
12 Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
45, 51 (2003).
4attempting to broaden the reach and enforcement of intellectual property rights to various other 
countries.13
A. TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement expanded and universalized the minimum levels of intellectual property 
protection for industrialized countries only after reaching a certain level of development.14 The 
agreed upon scope of protection for IPRs limited the options for developing countries in the 
design of their intellectual property systems.15 However, the TRIPS Agreement still allowed 
countries to adopt different strategies and definitions that could affect the scope and 
enforceability of these rights.16 This flexibility is critical for countries to be able to use their 
intellectual property legislation as a means of achieving a set of economic development, social 
development, and environmental protection objectives.17
To ease the economic and legislative burdens these new standards created, implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement provisions was not universally required to occur simultaneously. Developed 
countries like Canada or the United States had to apply all TRIPS provisions by January 1, 
1996.18 However, developing-country WTO Members did not have to apply most TRIPS
provisions until January 1, 2000.19 In 2000, developing countries yet to extend product-patent 
protection to all technology areas, could further delay the domestic application of these 
protections to any area not covered (e.g., pharmaceuticals) until 2005.20 A least-developed 
country WTO member could delay the implementation of most TRIPS provisions until the start 
of 2006, at which time it could further extend this transitional period by successfully persuading 
the TRIPS Council to exclude its transition period.21
13 Id. at 47; see also Allen Z. Hertz, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference: NAFTA 
Revisited: Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investor Protection Agreements, and at the 
World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 261-62 (1997).
14 Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
45, 52 (2003).
15 Id.
16 Id. For instance, the TRIPS Agreement does not define "invention," allowing countries to choose the definition 
that responds to their own needs.
17 Id.
18
 Allen Z. Hertz, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited: Shaping 
the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investor Protection Agreements, and at the World Trade 
Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 265 (1997).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
5However, the flexibility TRIPS allegedly provides has been called into question by 
commentators.22 Specifically, the TRIPS Agreement use of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding has limited member state’s policy choices due to the mandatory supranational 
adjudication that may be incurred by another member state’s complaint.23 These adjudications 
have resulted in the disallowance of various member states’ attempts to implement various 
aspects of TRIPS while still maintaining some domestic favoritisms or prejudices that were 
arguably within the scope of the Agreement’s terms.24
Some commentators believe that multilateral negotiations are a more favorable forum for less 
developed countries.25 In contrast, other observers believe that, at least in the instance of TRIPS, 
less developed countries negotiated away even more rights and flexibility than they would have 
in a bilateral setting with a superior power.26 Thus, there is some dispute over which negotiating 
forum, bilateral or multilateral, is the more equitable forum. It is quite possible that, contrary to 
U.S. coercion theorists’ claims, less developed countries may be wiser to use bilateral and 
regional multilateral agreements to negotiate with a larger, more developed country.27
B. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Since the signing of TRIPS, the most active international intellectual property law forum has 
been bilateral agreements.28 Generally, these agreements are between a developed country, like 
22
 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 819, 820 (2003).
23 Id. at 823.
24
 Specifically, examples comprise of Indian, American, and Canadian legislative actions that have been altered or 
overruled by such challenges. See Id. at 891-910
25 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 62 (2003) (“Matters are perhaps worse still when the 
U.S. acts unilaterally…”); see also Genetic Resources Action International, "TRIPS-plus" Through the Back Door: 
How Bilateral Treaties Impose Much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO, July, 2001, 
http://www.grain.org/publications/trips-plus-en.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (“[T]he quietly crafted mini-pacts 
between Washington and Amman, or Brussels and Dhaka, are where more damage is sometimes being done."); 
Various other academics and commentators believe multilateral settings are the more equitable forum. See generally 
AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media – General Issues, http://www.austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs1.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005)
26
 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 819, 850 (2003) (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement guaranteed a surplus for developed countries greater than what 
each state could otherwise have obtained on its own, as well as a surplus for developing countries in the form of 
enhanced trade concession in the areas of textiles and agriculture.”).
27 Id. If the developed countries have similar special interests groups and are capable of adequate collaboration due 
to similar interests, or special interests, then their aggregate negotiating power appears to be substantially larger than 
what any one developed country (even the U.S.) may have alone, in negotiations with one or perhaps a whole region 
of substantially similarly situated less developed countries with similar policy objectives or interests. 
28 Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
45, 52-53 (2003).
6the United States, and a less developed country, like Chile.29 Most commentators believe that the 
less developed countries agree to provide stronger IPRs, or TRIPS-plus, protections in exchange 
for greater access to the developed country’s markets and investors.30 These TRIPS-plus 
provisions define various IPRs or expand the scope or standard of an IPR beyond the minimal 
TRIPS standard, reducing the flexibility provided in the TRIPS Agreement.31 This same model is 
used for multilateral negotiations like the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 
the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), or the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).32
Recently, the United States has been extremely prolific in its bilateral negotiations, reaching 
agreements with Singapore, Morocco, Chile, Australia, El Salvador, Jordan, and eight other 
countries.33 It has also negotiated extensively with other Latin American and Caribbean countries 
on the FTAA. 34 Moreover, the U.S. is working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013 
and is also in bilateral negotiations with five countries within the Southern African Customs 
Union.35
Obviously, the United States, as the largest exporter of intellectual property driven goods, seeks 
to expand IPRs’ scope and enforcement.36 Moreover, because the U.S. represents about one fifth 
of the world economy, it has the most to offer less developed countries in terms of market access 
and investment opportunity.37 Thus, it should not be very surprising that the U.S. has been so 
active and successful in expanding TRIPS-plus protection to so many countries.
C. Non Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations 
A third and emerging party to these bilateral and multilateral negotiations are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which have increasingly been involved in challenging the TRIPS 
29 Id. at 53.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33
 Mumbai-India U.S. Consulate, U.S. and Bahrain Sign Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14, 2004, 
http://mumbai.usconsulate.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
34 Id. (explaining that in addition to the FTAA negotiations, the U.S. is involved in bilateral negotiations with 
Panama, Peru, Columbia, and Ecuador.). 
35
 In Africa, the U.S. is bilaterally negotiating with Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa, Lesotho, and Namibia. In 
Asia, beyond the Middle East, it is also negotiating with Thailand. See Id.
36
 Patrick Coleman, The U.S. Competitive Advantage in Intellectual Property Trade, 27 CHEMTECH 48 (1997), 
http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/chemtech/97/sep/comp.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
37 See NationMaster.com, Map & Graph: Economy: GDP, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco_gdp# (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005) (using 2002 values).
7Agreement and various bilateral or multilateral agreements expanding TRIPS plus protections.38
With the NGOs’ political, or at least mass media, clout, less developed countries have become 
capable of renegotiating supposedly settled treaties. For example, less developed countries, 
acting in tandem with NGOs, were able to extract the Public Health Declaration during a new 
round of WTO trade talks in Doha.39 This declaration applies to patented medicines, providing 
less developed countries access to such pharmaceuticals by granting them a longer transitional 
time before having to provide IPRs for such products.40 In addition to NGOs, there are 
intergovernmental organizations, like the World Health Organization and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, which are becoming heavily involved in international negotiations 
affected by intellectual property issues.41
This development has increased the number of forums available for different states or parties to 
attempt to affect policy to maximize their respective interests.42 Moreover, the various 
institutional structures, as they are designed, can provide a built-in bias in favor of developing 
countries. For example, WIPO administers implementation of existing intellectual property 
agreements and provides dispute settlement services, generating the revenue needed to fund its 
activities.43 Moreover, WIPO’s staff provides technical assistance and training to member states 
and their national intellectual property offices, the bulk of which is provided to developing 
countries.44 To further meet these developing countries’ needs, and raise more revenue, WIPO 
has expanded these services to include standing, expert, and intergovernmental committees that 
carry out studies on particular intellectual property topics and generate soft law guidelines and 
recommendations for consideration by WIPO member states.45 Thus, while WIPO is attempting 
to provide services to facilitate the implementation of negotiated intellectual property 
agreements, it also interacts most often with and directly impacts the policies of developing 
countries. This likely creates some conflict of interest since the same organization, made up of 
the same personnel, are greatly affecting various states’ policies and also adjudicating the 
38
 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (2004).
39 Id. at 5. This declaration is often referred to as the Doha Declaration.
40 Id.
41 Id. For example, these intergovernmental organizations have had intellectual property issues at or near the top of 
their agenda negotiations at the Convention on Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties and the Commission 
on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
42 Id. at 8.
43 Id. at 12.
44 Id.; Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 933, 949 (2003).
45
  Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004) 
8validity of such policies in light of the various agreements they must follow.46 This may be 
especially true in light of WIPO’s increasingly important role in influencing both TRIPS dispute 
settlement and member states’ proposals to amend or supplement TRIPS.47 Consequently, it 
would seem that these organizations would have, at the least, some slight bias towards the 
developing countries with which they often interact.48
D. Negotiation Forum Selection
Ultimately, the decision to use a bilateral or multilateral forum can have a large strategic impact 
on a country’s negotiations. Generally, a multilateral forum decreases a country’s control over 
negotiations because it dilutes a country’s control. In fact, the number of countries involved and 
their political influence are likely the most important factors to determine whether multilateral or 
bilateral negotiations are the most strategically desirable forum.49 For example, large multilateral 
forums can be very detrimental to developing countries if the developed countries (e.g. U.S., 
U.K., Canada, etc.) have similar tradeoffs and objectives to most proposals or topics while the 
developing countries’ tradeoffs and objectives are more varied.50 In this type of setting, 
46 But see Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 933, 949 (2003) (explaining that 
WIPO receives 85-90% of its budget from PTC application filing fees. The majority of these filings result from large 
biotech or biolife science corporations.).
47
 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 26 & 59-60 (2004).
48 Id. at 14 & 20-21. One consequence of this bias may be the United States and European Community (EU) to shift 
intellectual property lawmaking from WIPO to GATT due to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by 
WIPO. Moreover, GATT is more likely biased in favor of the U.S. and the EU because these parties enjoy 
substantial negotiating leverage in this forum. See also Id. at 61 (“[R]egime shifting enhances developing states’ 
bargaining power within the WTO and WIPO. It facilitates a proactive negotiating strategy, enabling governments 
and NGOs to coordinate their efforts around hard and soft law proposals first vetted and refined in other 
international venues.”); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 , 423 (2004) (“[O]ur nodal world is replete with opportunities for alliances, 
partnerships, and forum shifting, all of which enable the weak to exercise influence over agendas”).
49
 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV., 819, 884-85 (2003) (“In the area of intellectual property particularly, state power is a critical variable for 
predicting outcome because intellectual ‘property’ is inherently a product of the exercise of state regulatory 
powers.”).
50 Id. at 849-850 
(While the proposals submitted by respective states generally fell within the categories of 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, the divisions were neither that exact nor predictable. 
Indeed, over the period of negotiations, the coalition formation between developed countries 
altered as different issues arose. The same was true for developing countries. Within these 
descriptive categories, several different coalition configurations emerged with some countries 
ostensibly acting independently.); 
Id. at 849 n.96
 (For example, the Andean Group (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) and the Group of Ten 
(Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia) 
focused on different issues at different stages of the negotiations. The Group of Ten had early on 
opposed the idea of TRIPS while the Andean Group was involved in making proposals at later 
stages of negotiations.).
9developed countries can essentially implement a “divide and conquer” strategy, playing the 
weaker factions off of each other to enhance their negotiating power more effectively and 
substantially than they could in a bilateral forum.51 Moreover, a single country, or even a small 
group can less afford the option of “walking away” from any deal when a multilateral forum 
consists of a large portion of the world. Other countries involved in the negotiations are likely to 
decide on standards that these countries will eventually have to accept to continue to be a viable 
global trading partner.
E. IPR Negotiation Theories
There are generally three types of theories that attempt to explain the use of bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs to expand IPRs: (1) U.S. or EU coercion of less powerful economic 
countries52, (2) multinational corporation lobbying53, and (3) autonomous policy agreements, 
which are made to maximize a constituency’s well being.54 The theories falling within the first 
category essentially argue that an international hegemon can mostly impose and enforce its 
desired rules and international policies upon weaker powers.55 As a result of the hegemon’s 
power, it will usually act through independent decision making or through bilateral negotiation to 
maximize the relational power disparity.56
The theories that fall under the second category, multinational corporate lobbying theories, 
essentially argue that multinational corporations effectively lobby all parties, even resorting to 
developing “false hopes,” which is a type of subterfuge, in order to obtain international policies 
that favor their business interests.57 Thus, large multinational corporations, or entire industries 
explicitly or implicitly collude to obtain beneficial policies.58 However, these entities usually 
lobby all, or a substantial amount of, the parties of a negotiation to obtain the desired result.59
51Ruth L. Okediji discusses this in great detail. See Id. at 838-68.
52 See Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1032-41 (2004); cf. Ian L.G. 
Wadley, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term 
Assessment: Environment: U.S. and Them: Hubs, Spokes & Integration with Reference to Transboundary 
Environment and Resources Issues, 21 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 572, 572-73 (2003). 
53 See Peter Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public 
Hope, 592 ANNALS 18 (2004).
54 See Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1058-60 (2004).
55 Id. at 1036-37.
56 Id. at 1036.
57 See Peter Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public 
Hope, 592 ANNALS 18, 19-21 (2004).
58 Id. at 25.
59 Id. at 25 & 30.
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The theories that fall under the third category, autonomous policy agreement theories, essentially 
argue the all parties to a negotiation come to an agreement that best serves the public welfare of 
their constituencies.60 Thus, the parties to a negotiation implement various negotiating tactics or 
strategies to maximize their constituency’s well being.61 While special interests and NGOs may 
play some role in the development of each party’s negotiation strategy, these theories suggest 
that parties are sophisticated enough to determine what is actually in its constituency’s best 
interests and act correspondingly.62
F. Case Study – Testing Hypotheses
Keeping these three types of theories in mind, this paper will set out to test each one against real 
world bilateral FTA negotiations. A case study comparing negotiations between the U.S. and 
Chile with negotiations between the U.S. and Australia will be used to test the viability of these 
theories. 
In this case study Chile will be used to represent a less developed country negotiating with an 
alleged hegemon, the U.S.63 Chile is used because it has recently signed an FTA with the U.S. 
and because it is generally representative of most less developed countries. For example, Chile 
relies on natural resources and agriculture for a majority of its exports and domestic economy.64
Further, Chile has only recently become a democracy, having been led by a military junta until 
around 1990. 65
Australia, on the other hand, will be used to represent a developed country negotiating with a 
more powerful, but relatively similarly sophisticated power, the U.S.66 Australia has a very 
60 See Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1053-54 (2004).
61 Id.
62 Id.; One example of this type of theory would be that the American negotiators knowingly act to maximize IPRs
because it will maximize the net benefit to its citizens and a less developed country agrees in return for American 
concessions that will also yield a maximum net benefit to its citizens.
63 See Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1058-60 (2004).
64
 Export Council for Energy Efficiency, Market Assessment of Chile, (1999), 
http://www.ecee.org/pubs/assess/Chile/Chile.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (Chile’s Economy and Investment 
Conditions Chapter/Section was specifically referenced.).
65 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 200 (1998).
66
 AUSTA, Can Australia Negotiate with the US?, http://www.austa.net/analyst/analyst5.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005).
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sophisticated economy, with services being its economy’s largest sector.67 Moreover, Australia 
has been a very stable politically and economically, and has experienced great economic growth 
over the past twenty years.68
III. Chile
In this case study, Chile is an example of a less developed country. Chile should provide a good 
model because it has only recently become a democracy after a fifteen year junta followed a 
coup of the democratically elected socialist government. In large part, the junta occurred due to 
mismanagement, massive corruption, and hyperinflation. Thus, Chile is a less developed country 
essentially rebuilding its economic and political infrastructure, a situation likely to face any new 
government established amid the current turmoil of many less developed countries (e.g. Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ukraine, etc.). Similarly, Chile is rich in agricultural (e.g. fruit) and 
mineral resources (e.g. copper). This situation is similar to many other less developed countries 
that are rich in natural resources.
Based on various theories presented by commentators, one could expect Chile’s bilateral FTA 
with the U.S. to have resulted from various scenarios: it could be a result of the U.S. leveraging 
its “hegemonic” power by attempting to coerce Chile into an FTA69, it could be Chile’s attempt 
to further its economic policy by negotiating away IPRs for greater access to the U.S. market70, 
or it could be the result of massive multinational corporations furthering their own economic 
interests.71
In order to test these theories, a brief background of Chile’s recent history is necessary to 
appreciate and understand the potential motivations and objectives that may have been 
implicated in entering into an FTA with the U.S.
67
 Economist Intelligence Unit, Australia Economic Structure, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 24, 2004), 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Australia/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Economic%20Structure (last visited Feb. 
21, 2005).
68
 CIA World Fact Book, Australia, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/as.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005).
69 See Ruth Gana Okediji, Symposium on Globalization at the Margins: Perspectives on Globalization from 
Developing States: Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 133 
(1999).
70
 Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7-12 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005).
71
 Peter Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public 
Hope, 592 ANNALS 18, 20-21 (2004); see also Christopher T. Marsden, Cyberlaw and International Political 
Economy: Towards Regulation of the Global Information Society, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. REV. 355, 400-04 (2001) 
(LEXIS cites this journal as L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L.).
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A. Democracy Produced by a Totalitarian Response to the Failures of Socialism
Chile has likely enjoyed the most political and economic stability of any country in South 
America for the last 10-15 years. In fact, over the last six years it has experienced annual 
inflation below 5% and realized an 8% annual GDP growth throughout the 1990s.72 In contrast, 
it seems hard to believe Chile was a country in chaos around 1970. 
Under the Frei government, the Chileanisation of major copper mines and an agrarian reform 
allowed the Chilean government to expropriate any landholding of more than 80 hectares.73
These reforms included the nationalization of copper mines formerly controlled by American 
investors.74 These socialist reforms were passed into law during the mid 1960s.75 They were 
originally hailed as successful, and were expanded in the early 1970s.76 Moreover, most of the 
banks and other important financial and manufacturing concerns were nationalized by 1972.77
Because these reforms were initially successful, the socialist political parties responsible for 
them gained more support, instituted wage increases and froze prices in late 1971.78 The 
expansion of such reforms ultimately led to skyrocketing inflation and massive governmental 
budget problems.79 While the Chilean economy grew at around 7.7% in 1971, it also experienced 
22% inflation.80 By 1972, due to expanded socialist economic reforms, inflation rose to 260% 
and by 1973 inflation had risen even higher, to 600%.81 Ultimately, these conditions became 
untenable, and similar to other countries that have experienced severe economic misfortune, a 
military coup occurred, replacing the old, democratically elected socialist government with a 
junta.82
72
  U.S. Department of State, U.S. – Chile Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet, July 22, 2003, http://www.state.gov 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
73 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 78-79 (1998).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 98-99.
77 Id. at 95-96.
78 Id at 102-103.
79 Id. at 102-103 (explaining that from 1970-71, Chile’s governmental budget went from a $113 million surplus to a 
$309 million dollar deficit.).
80 Id.
81 Id. (explaining that Chile's economy was also affected by a drop in world copper prices. However, this had a 
relatively slight impact when compared to the conditions created by the Allendre government’s economic 
mismanagement.).
82 Id.; cf. George J.W. Goodman, The German Hyperinflation, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/ess_germanhyperinflation.html. (last visited Feb. 
21, 2005). Nazi Germany, for example, was created in part, due to the economic conditions created, for the most 
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This junta, led by General Pinochet, eliminated the elected socialist government with the goal of 
extirpating the communists out of Chile.83 Unfortunately, like other coups or violent uprisings, 
this goal was taken to its extreme.84 Ultimately, Chile’s army was responsible for about 3,200 
deaths or disappearances.85
By 1980, the Military began softening its control, allowing the creation of a Constitution.86 This 
eventually led to elections in 1981 which, unsurprisingly, led to the election of General Pinochet 
for an eight year term. 87
B. Economic Reforms Initiated by the Pinochet Regime
By 1973, Chilean inflation was over 600% and rising.88 The government debt accounted for 25% 
of Chile’s GDP, which was likely to rise because the nationalized industries were losing about 
$500 million a year.89 However, by Pinochet’s election, GDP had risen by 5% in three 
consecutive years and inflation was down to 31%.90 The economic reforms that laid the 
groundwork for Chile’s recovery was the result of a Point IV exchange program that sent 
Chilean students to U.S. universities to receive higher degrees.91 Many of these students went to 
the University of Chicago where they studied the monetarist theory of economics validated and 
made famous by Milton Friedman.92 Some of these students held government posts and were 
part, from the Versailles treaty. These conditions led to inflation rates that, at its worst, resulted in food prices 
doubling or tripling in a matter of hours. 
83 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 117 (1998).
84 Id. at 123. (explaining that the specific targets for most of these deaths and disappearances were the MIR and 
similar communist related groups. They were progressively tracked down and destroyed by the DINA, which was 
the secret police force of Pinochet’s junta. While the MIR and communist groups were potentially “legitimate” 
targets for their abusive overseeing of the agrarian reforms and their terrorist-like tactics, DINA went beyond this 
original mandate. Ultimately, it became powerful enough to scare or destroy any type of opposition group and even 
earned senior junta members’ distrust for its ruthless tactics.).
85 Id.; See also Jen Ross, Legal Momentum Gathers in Chile Against Pinochet, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 25, 2004, 
at A16, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24890-2004Dec24.html (explaining that 
General Pinochet is now being prosecuted in Chile for his involvement in overseeing DINA’s actions).
86 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 134 (1998).
87 Id. at 135-36.
88 Id. at 135.
89 Id.
90 Id.; see also BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM 288 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that 
while Pinochet may have used his influence to create conditions favorable to his election, the economic recovery he 
oversaw from 1973-80 likely also contributed to his election.).
91 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 136 (1998).
92 Id.
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promoted to administer the economy by the Pinochet junta by the middle of 1973.93
Consequently, these economists, known as the Chicago Boys, drastically cut government 
spending, significantly dropped tariffs on foreign goods, and abolished price controls.94 For two 
years, the economy suffered enormous setbacks, including substantial GDP loss, unemployment 
increases, and high inflation.95
While these reforms were certainly difficult for a supermajority of Chileans, by 1980, they began 
having a positive effect, resulting in high GDP growth and much lower inflation.96 By 1981, 
inflation was down to 9.1%, GDP was growing at a 5.5% clip, the fiscal deficit had turned into a 
surplus, and a real rise in salaries had seen consecutive years of substantial growth.97 Moreover, 
the policy of promoting export-driven growth was beginning to produce impressive results.98
Natural resources like fruit, timber, and fishing products were being increasingly produced and 
exported, diversifying Chile’s economy and reducing Chile’s reliance on its mining industries.99
As prosperity grew, profits and benefits did begin to “trickle down,” both in wages and in social 
welfare as the policy focus began to shift to labor law development, education, justice, and other 
social policies.100 These social reforms ultimately outlived the Pinochet government and have 
served as models for many other Latin American countries.101
C. The Fall of Free Markets and the Demise of Pinochet
In 1982, oil prices skyrocketed and triggered, along with wild investment speculation, a massive 
recession that caused Chile’s GDP to fall by over 14%.102 This crash decreased standards of 
living and resulted in an outburst of street protests by many people in the lower and middle
classes.103 By 1984, Chile’s free market model was being reassessed from the positive influence 
93 Id.
94 Id. at 140.
95 Id. (showing that inflation was at 343% in 1975, which was half of what it was in 1973. Also, GDP fell by 13% 
and unemployment dropped from 1974 levels. However, the reforms instituted by the Chicago Boys predicted such 
results from their policies, their thinking being that there would be no lasting, long term gain without some massive 
short term pain.); see also BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM 269 (3d ed. 2001).
96 Id. at 145.
97 Id. (defining real rise in salary as gross salary increase adjusted for inflationary affects.).
98 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 145 (1998).
99 Id. (Chile has about 20% of the world’s copper supply.).
100 Id. at 148-49.
101 Id. at 149.
102 BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM 280-82 (3d ed. 2001).
103 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 181 (1998).
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high tariffs and export incentives had in creating a mild reflation.104 However, fears of a return to 
the prior socialist system surfaced, and many of the free market policies instituted in the late 
1970s were slowly reinstituted.105
At this time, the Pinochet government was fielding harsh criticism. Because of his regime’s 
violent and autocratic tactics and Chile’s lack of progress toward democracy, U.S. policy turned 
against Pinochet in 1984.106  In 1988, Chile held a plebiscite to determine if Pinochet and the 
Chilean military would reign for another 8 years or whether Chile would implement democratic 
elections. 107 Pinochet lost by nine percentage points.108
After elections were held in 1989, elected president Patricio Aylwin agreed with the opposition 
parties to accept a free market economic system along the main lines of the economic policy 
established during the military regime.109 By the end of the 1980s, Chile’ average per capita 
income was about $2,000.110 The 1990s saw Chilean economic policies of encouraging free 
markets result in high GDP growth while unemployment decreased.111 Six years after free 
elections, Chile’s average pre capita income had risen by 250% to $4,740.112  Moreover, Chile 
instituted government programs to enhance the “trickle down” effect of this economic growth, 
decreasing the proportion of Chileans living in poverty from 40% to 24% by 1996.113 Chile’s 
policies have been wildly successful, resulting in its per capita income doubling from $4,740 in 
1996, to $9,140 in 2002.114
104 Id. at 184.
105 Id. at 185.
106 Id. at 186.
107 Id. at 199.
108 Id. at 200. These plebiscites, as required by the 1980 Constitution developed after the military replaced the 
corrupt socialist leaders of 1972, were to be held every eight years until the military (Pinochet) lost. After the 
military lost, democratic elections were to be implemented.) (Pinochet had the support of the Vice Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and the Chilean army to ignore the election result. However Pinochet refused this opportunity, 
claiming he had sworn to uphold the 1980 Constitution and would abide by the results. Thus, the military’s control 
ended after 15 years.
109 Id. at 205.
110 Id. at 206.
111 Id. at 212 (showing that in 1988, per capita income was $1,890, inflation was 14.7%, and unemployment was 
8.3%.  By 1995, inflation was 8.2% and unemployment was 5.5%. Moreover, GDP had risen 250% to $4,740.).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 213.
114 See NationMaster.com, Map & Graph: Economy: GDP (PPP) (per capita) (Top 50 Countries),
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco_gdp_ppp_cap# (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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Thus, in the last 30 years, which involved a coup and resulting junta that caused fifteen years of 
highly volatile and oftentimes repressive policies, Chile has grown its economy and its citizens 
have achieved the 16th highest GDP growth rate in the world.115 Moreover, it has been the only 
Latin American country to achieve this growth in a steady, stable manner, while diversifying its 
economy by expanding its manufacturing base.116
While Chile has a large portion of its population still living in poverty, there is little support for 
government intervention to redistribute the rewards of its economic growth.117 Instead, Chilean 
policies are focused on increasing economic efficiency, expanding access to markets, and 
exploiting all of Chile’s comparative advantages to create the wealth needed to provide for 
greater overall prosperity.118 Thus, to effectuate these policies, the last decade has seen Chile at 
the forefront of negotiating FTAs of varying scope.
D. Chile’s International Policies and Negotiations
Since the early 1990’s Chile has pursued its trade objectives through a multidimensional trade 
policy.119  This involved consolidating its unilateral policy of openness as well as negotiating 
new bilateral free trade agreements, fine-tuning existing agreements, and actively participating in 
regional and multilateral forums and negotiations.120
Having suffered for a long time from intermittent boycotts by the U.S. and a general reluctance 
by Western countries to maintain more than formal relationships with Chile throughout the 
Pinochet regime, Chile was interested in ensuring uninterrupted trade relationships.121 Thus, 
Chile began negotiations to enter into various new regional and inter American agreements that 
emerged at the end of the 1980s. 122 In 1990, President Bush stated that Chile would be the 
United States’s first choice for inclusion in NAFTA.123 However, in spite of this policy 
announcement and numerous promises from various U.S. delegations that included visits from 
115 See NationMaster.com, Chile Economy, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ci/Economy&b_define=1 (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
116
 World Bank, Economy, at 3 (2002), http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/economy.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005); see also Export Council for Energy Efficiency, Market Assessment of Chile, (1999), 
http://www.ecee.org/pubs/assess/Chile/Chile.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (Chapter/Section 1 entitled, “Chile’s 
Economy and Investment Conditions,” was specifically used).
117 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 225 (1998).
118 Id.
119
 Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
120 Id. at 7-8.
121 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 215 (1998).
122 Id.
123 Id.
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various U.S. senators, the U.S. failed to incorporate Chile into NAFTA or negotiate a bilateral 
agreement similar to NAFTA for fourteen years.124
Because Chile’s foreign trade is relatively evenly distributed between the U.S., Latin America, 
the European Union, and Asia, Chile’s international focus was not limited to the U.S. market.  
Thus, Chile expanded its search for other free trade or reduced tariff agreements with various 
trading partners.125 For example, Chile entered into bilateral FTAs with Mexico in 1991, 
Venezuela and Colombia in 1993, and Ecuador  in 1994.126 Moreover, while negotiating these 
bilateral trade agreements, Chile was involved in various multilateral negotiations, many of 
which came to fruition by the mid 1990’s.127 In 1996, Chile became a formal associate member 
to Mercosur, a free trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.128 Chile 
also joined the APEC agreement, which consists of the U.S., Canada, and all the principal 
countries of the Pacific Basin, and entered into an association agreement with the European 
Union.129 While all this was being negotiated, Chile was also actively involved with the WTO, 
with its primary focus on promoting further and more far reaching multilateral trade 
agreements.130
From 1998-2002 Chile was able to negotiate even more FTAs, making pacts with South Korea, 
Canada, and Central American countries.131 Moreover, Chile was able to move beyond its 
association agreement by entering into a full FTA with the European Union.132 These agreements 
led to these countries’ goods displacing American goods in the Chilean market.133 In fact, the 
U.S. went from having a slight trade surplus with Chile to running a trade deficit as Chileans 
substituted cheaper European goods for American goods.134 After two years of decreasing sales, 
124 Id. at 216. 
125 Id. at 217.
126 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Chile 1997, (Sept. 10, 1997), http://www.wto.org (last visited, 
Feb. 21, 2005).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131
 Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-Chile 
Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 390-91 (2004); Chilean Government, Trade Policy 
Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
132
  Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003) http://www.wto.org.
133
 Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-Chile 
Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 399 & 401 (2004).
134 Id. at 401.
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the U.S. reasserted its desire to negotiate an FTA.135 While the Americans had been slow to act 
under the Bush and Clinton administrations of the 1990s, the economic losses it experienced 
provided the necessary motivation and urgency for Chile to make an FTA it had coveted for over 
ten years.136
The history of Chile’s economic and political development may provide a basis for analyzing 
which hypothesis, or combination of hypotheses best explains Chile’s decision to enter into a 
bilateral FTA with the U.S.
IV. Australia
Australia is really the only developed country other than Canada to agree to some type of FTA 
with the United States, and is the only one to do so in a bilateral forum. Moreover, Australia 
provides a good comparison with Chile because both countries’ main exports to the U.S. are 
mineral (e.g. gold, iron ore, coal) and agricultural (e.g. wool, wheat, beef) goods.137 However, 
Australia has been more stable politically and has a much more developed economy, with 
services and manufacturing making up much larger parts of its economy.138
Based on various theories presented by commentators, one could expect Australia’s bilateral 
FTA with the U.S. to have resulted from various scenarios: it could be due to the U.S. leveraging 
its “hegemonic” power by attempting to coerce Australia into an FTA,139 it could be Australia’s 
attempt to further its economic policy by negotiating away IPRs for greater access to the U.S. 
market,140 or it could be the result of massive multinational corporations furthering their own 
economic interests.141
135 Id.; see also Aaron Schavey, How Trade Promotion Authority Would Bolster the Manufacturing Industry, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER NO. 1561 (June 21, 2002), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1561.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
136 Id.; JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 215 (1998).
137
 American Australian Association, Australia Fact Sheet, at 1 (Feb. 7, 2005), 
http://www.americanaustralian.org/Corporate/pdf/australiafactsheet.pdf (last visited, Feb. 21, 2005).
138 Compare CIA World Fact Book, Australia, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/as.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005) and CIA World Fact Book, Chile, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (Feb. 21, 
2005) (Specifically, compare the export and import commodities of both countries. Australia’s main imports 
(machinery and transport equipment, computers and office machines, telecommunication equipment and parts) are 
generally for more advanced/sophisticated industries then Chile’s (consumer goods, chemicals, motor vehicles, 
fuels, electrical machinery, heavy industrial machinery, food)).
139 See Ruth Gana Okediji, Symposium on Globalization at the Margins: Perspectives on Globalization from 
Developing States: Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 133 
(1999).
140
 Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
141
 Peter Drahos, Hope, Power, and Governance: Section One: Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public 
Hope, 592 ANNALS 18, 20-21 (2004) see also Christopher T. Marsden, Cyberlaw and International Political 
Economy: Towards Regulation of the Global Information Society, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. REV.  355, 400-04 
(LEXIS cites this as L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L).
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In order to test these theories, a brief background of Australia’s economy and recent history is 
discussed below to appreciate and understand the potential motivations and objectives that may 
have been implicated in entering into an FTA with the U.S.
A. Traditionally Stable First World Economy 
Australia’s economy traditionally has relied on natural resources, specifically wool and gold, to 
achieve its political and economic success.142 In the 1890’s, Australia was a moderately 
protectionist country with Free Traders and Protectionists compromising to achieve efficient 
production and redistribution policies.143 Protectionists in Australia thought that tariff increase 
could increase employment and redistribute income to the less wealthy.144 However, as mining 
industries became a large portion of Australia’s income and a major source of its exports, this 
attitude became less popular.145
Australia’s system of protection relied heavily on administratively allocated quotas that were 
designed to protect items of mass consumption like textiles, footwear, and clothing.146 However, 
this policy closed off opportunities for the expansion of Australia’s most productive industries, 
which was necessary to increase wages, employment, and government services.147 For example, 
the industries that received the major benefit from these quotas (textiles, clothing, and footwear) 
experienced steep declines in domestic consumption during the 1970s.148 However, as these 
industries were compared to less protected ones, their employment rates fell by a similar 
proportion.149 Thus, in spite of the fact that protectionist measures redistributed income to the 
protected industries in a much larger proportion, it yielded no improved result.150 Moreover, the 
government subsidy was being used to artificially enhance goods that disproportionately and 
detrimentally affected poor Australians’ purchasing power because these measures were applied 
to necessities (clothing and footwear).151
142 ROSS GARNAUT, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA’S ASIAN FUTURE 131 (2001).
143 Id. at 44.
144 Id. at 45.
145 Id.
146 Id. Quotas were not like tariffs because it affected only selected income. Thus, they essentially acted as a 
government subsidy to certain some groups at the expense of other groups.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 41.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 41 & 46.
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As it became more apparent that Australia’s protectionist measures and system were flawed, 
disproportionately affecting the economic well being of the poor, Australia began to rethink its 
economic and trade policies.152  As a result, Australia began liberalizing its trade policies in the 
early 1980’s.153 This decreased Australia’s reliance on wool and mineral exports by raising 
international competitiveness of all production of tradeable goods.154 While wool and mineral 
exports expanded, manufacturing and services expanded even more.155 However, in spite of all 
this diversification, wool and mining industries still represent the bulk of Australian exports.156
The net effect of Australia’s trade liberalization policy is that it suddenly made Australia a 
credible participant in bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations in textile trade, which 
would greatly affect its large wool industry.157 Thus, one of Australia’s primary objectives was to 
advance textile trade liberalization in order to further increase its market access into the global 
wool and textile markets.158
B. International Economic Policies
Australia’s trade liberalization has a large impact on its policy outlook. Australia is committed to 
achieving free and open trade with all the developed Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
countries by 2010, and the less developed ones by 2020.159 Specifically, Australia is focused on 
investment liberalization and expanding and encouraging business cooperation.160 Moreover, 
Australia has sought to strengthen IPRs, but not copyright related IPRs.161
152 Id. at 46.
153 Id. at 132; see also Australian Government, Trade Policy Review: Australia 2002, (Sept. 25, 2002), 
http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that tariff reduction from 1970-2001 has seen a drop 
from 35% to 4.8% for manufacturing and 28% to 6% drop for agriculture. Australia also continues to 
disproportionately favor clothing and footwear sectors, but has dropped this support significantly, and plans to 
continue decreasing the disproportionate favoring.).
154 ROSS GARNAUT, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA’S ASIAN FUTURE 131 (2001).
155 Id. at 132 & 134.
156 Id. at 139.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Australian Government, Trade Policy Review: Australia 2002, (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.wto.org (This is 
pretty significant because APEC represents about 50% of global trade, including the U.S. and Chile.).
160 Id.
161 Id.. While it may say this in a governmental report to the WTO, it seems that Australia is certainly not interested 
in strengthening, or expanding IPRs in the biotech/pharmaceutical industry that would negatively affect its 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Moreover, it was not willing to ratify the WIPO Copyright and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms treaties until signing an FTA with the U.S. (The U.S. implementation of these WIPO 
treaties was the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)). See AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media – Issues Likely 
to Arise in an Agreement, http://www.austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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Australia also has signed an FTA with New Zealand and, in addition to its objectives within 
APEC, is looking to expand FTAs with other regional associations, particularly The Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).162
C. Decision to Enter Into an FTA with the U.S.
Australia also recently entered into an FTA with the U.S. Unlike Chile, there was extensive 
internal debate as to whether entering into this FTA was in its best interests. The proponents of 
entering into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. cited various reasons, some of which were similar to 
Chile’s. For example, Australia wanted to increase its access to U.S. markets, increase American 
foreign investment, and increase protections for its American investments. 163 Unlike Chile, 
which lacks significant anti-globalization organizations or political parties, Australia has political 
parties that are anti-globalization or anti-United States.164 Moreover, Australia has other 
influential commentators that are against bilateral agreements because of their feared negative 
impact on forming multilateral agreements.165 However, the political parties against an FTA with 
the U.S. only made up about ten percent of Australia’s electorate.166
162
 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ASEAN-Australia / New Zealand Free Trade Agreement Worth 
Pursuing, at 1, (Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.acci.asn.au/text_files/issues_papers/Trade/ASEAN-Aust-
NZ%20_August%202004_.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
163
 Alan Oxley, Report on the New Year, THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW (Jan. 2, 2002), 
http://www.austa.net/publicForum/publicForum4.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); FTA Analyst, AUSTA, 
Increasing Investment Too, (ed. Alan Oxley, Sept. 5, 2003), http://www.austa.net/analyst/analyst16.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005) (42% of Australia’s foreign investment was distributed to the United States); see also David 
Richardson, Foreign Investment and he Australian United States Free Trade Agreement, at 5 (Mar. 8, 2004), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2003-04/04cib07.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (U.S. foreign investment 
represented 33% of the total value of foreign investment in 2002-03.).
164
 AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media – Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement,
http://www.austa.net/quickBriefs/quickBriefs3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
165
 AUSTA, Quick Briefs for Media – Issues Likely to Arise in an Agreement, http://www.austa.net (last visited Feb. 
21, 2005); see generally, The Australian Interest, http://www.australianinterest.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
(various websites and links and articles provided on the FTA with the U.S.) and compare with Business Council of 
Australia, Free Trade Agreement with the United States, (Feb. 10, 2004), 
http://www.bca.com.au/content.asp?newsID=94430 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). It seems rather surprising that 
various arguments are made by groups against an FTA that claim Australian business will suffer, while business 
groups are generally very optimistic about the FTA and the new prospects it may create. Seeing that Australia’s 
government even thinks its trade liberalization policies are a major reason for its economic success of the past 10-15 
years, this argument, at least, does not appear to make much sense. However, it is possible that some Australians 
may be negatively affected in other ways that may not affect businesses as much as it may affect individuals.  For 
example, it is claimed by some sources that drug prices will go up as a result of this FTA. Thus, while an FTA may 
have a net positive impact on business, it could have a net negative impact on individuals or possibly just health 
related sectors of Australian society/business (assuming prices do go up as a result of the FTA). Regardless, it seems 
that most of these claims of a net negative economic impact are likely over exaggerated because both a vast major of 
political parties and business leaders promoted the FTA.
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Thus, while there was more public debate in Australia, the supermajority of its electorate appear 
to have come to a similar conclusion, which was: even if it had to strengthen IPRs, an FTA with 
the U.S. was in its best interests.167
Australia’s economic development and history over the past few decades should provide some 
insight into determining which hypothesis or hypotheses best explains Australia’s decision to 
enter into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. These hypotheses are more extensively assessed below.
V. Summary of Findings 
This part of the paper will analyze the results discovered in parts III and IV to assess each 
country’s experience through the lens of each generalized theory: U.S. hegemony, multinational 
corporate lobbying, and autonomous policy implementation. Additionally, this section will 
project these findings into other areas of discourse. Specifically, it will discuss the ramifications 
these results may have on determining whether a bilateral or multilateral forum is more equitable 
for less developed countries negotiating with developed countries and whether NGOs should be 
involved in IPR related negotiations.
A. Chile
Chile obviously was not coerced into an FTA with the United States. Instead, Chile had to 
negotiate for over a decade and first enter an FTA with the EU before the United States would 
agree to meaningful negotiations. In fact, were it not for the loss of market share U.S. goods 
experienced as a result of Chile’s previously made agreement, it is possible the U.S. would have 
continued to shun Chile, especially considering the potential political ramifications the 
agreement could have made in the 2004 elections.168 Thus, Chile’s negotiating tactics show an 
experience or sophistication that is capable of both balancing the interests of various partners, 
and also negotiating with various other parties. Chile wasn’t just negotiating with the U.S during 
this time. It was also and is also involved in numerous other organizations and bilateral 
agreements, ranging from APEC to bilateral talks with various other countries like South Korea, 
Canada, and other Latin American countries. If anything, the U.S. was coerced into an agreement 
with Chile by Chile’s successful negotiation of an FTA with the EU, which arose, in part, 
because the EU knew it would become much more competitive with American goods by 
agreeing to such an FTA.169
were for the FTA with the U.S. While people vote on numerous issues, this supermajority illustrates, at the least, 
that an FTA with the United States was a minor issue for most voters in this election.
168 Cf. Paul Blustein, Central American Agreement Could Have Been Big Campaign Issue, WASHINGTON POST, May 
28, 2004, at E4. 
169 See Lindsay M. Faine, Note, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the United States-
Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 401 (2004); see also The Heritage Foundation, 
Backgrounder No. 1561 (June 21, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1561.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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Thus, it appears that both a developed and less developed country have various tactics and 
powers available to them in bilateral negotiations that aren’t inherently unfair or biased. In fact, 
this case study suggests that less developed countries are just as capable and sophisticated 
negotiators as developed countries. Specifically, Chile’s decision to engage in bilateral 
negotiations actually provided it the necessary freedom to make an agreement with the U.S. A 
multilateral setting would not have allowed Chile to play the U.S. against other large interest 
groups like the EU, because the EU and the U.S. would have been much more likely to be 
aligned against a less developed country like Chile.170 Moreover, because Chile has only been a 
stable government for about 15 years, it is not necessarily true that a significantly long time 
period is required to develop negotiation expertise.171
Chile, as a democracy, represents the will of the majority of its people in negotiating FTAs and 
other international agreements. Because it views its trade liberalization policy as the main reason 
for its quintupled per capita income over the last fifteen years, its decision to continue to further 
this policy goal is unlikely due to outside coercion.172 Instead, it appears to reflect the apparent 
success its policies have had and its populations desire to continue to expand these policies. 
Specifically, agreeing to increased IPRs, when few, if any, significant Chilean interests are 
exposed to potential problems in order to expand its competitiveness and market access to core 
economic interest groups appears to be a well reasoned and politically justifiable action.173
Moreover, as history has indicated, it appears to be working and will provide the opportunity for 
Chile to increasingly develop a manufacturing base and educational institution expertise.174 It 
takes excess money to create institutions capable of improving education and environmental 
goals, which provide educated work forces capable of more technologically sophisticated 
production of goods related to pharmaceuticals, software, or electronics. 175 Moreover, Chilean 
dependence on American foreign investment and its desire to increase or at least maintain this 
170
 Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 819, 850 (2003).
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 Mehdi Shafaeddin, How Did Developed Countries Industrialize? The History of Trade and Industrial Policy: The 
Cases of Great Britain and the USA, at 11 (Dec. 1998), http:// www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_139.en.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that very fast and timely policy implementation may be necessary for a less developed 
country to have any success at effectively implementing their economic policy goals).
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 Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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 See Id.
174 See CIA, The World Fact Book – Chile, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) 
(economy overview section) and European Trade Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations-Chile, (Oct. 2002), 
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 Mehdi Shafaeddin, How Did Developed Countries Industrialize? The History of Trade and Industrial Policy: The 
Cases of Great Britain and the USA, at 6 (1998), http:// www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp_139.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 
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same level of investment is directly benefited from increasing various measures.176 Thus, Chile 
appears to have given up very little in order to gain greater access to one fifth of the world’s 
economic marketplace. 
1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. hegemony
Based on the long period of time it took the U.S to enter into a bilateral FTA with Chile, it 
appears unlikely the FTA resulted from any direct application of American hegemonic power. In 
fact, because the U.S. only entered into meaningful negotiations after Chile successfully 
negotiated an agreement with the EU, it seems that Chile used different negotiating tactics in 
order to facilitate an FTA with the U.S, which had been one of its major policy goals since 
1990.177
In fact, Chile has engaged in various forums to further its trade liberalization policies. From 
entering Mercorsur, to bilateral FTAs with the EU, Mexico, Canada, and other countries, to 
entering APEC, it appears unlikely this activity can be truly attributed to U.S. hegemonic power 
or influence. Instead, it seems Chile actively seeks to implement its policies by promoting 
agreements and effectuate occurrences it believes will increase its citizens’ well being.178 At the 
very least, the Chilean government does not appear to feel it was coerced into the bilateral 
agreement.179 As the Chilean government wrote in its most recent WTO report:
 [The] Free Trade Agreement [with the U.S.] shows that a developing 
country can reach a mutually satisfactory and comprehensive agreement 
with a developed country, an agreement which does not merely focus on 
market access, but also attaches importance to institutional matters that 
contribute to transparency and improved conditions of competition which, 
over time, will benefit all countries that trade with Chile.180
In view of the Chilean government’s understanding of its FTA negotiations with the 
U.S. and the economic occurrences underlying the American negotiation and 
agreement to the FTA, it does not appear that American hegemony or coercion played 
any role in the negotiations.181
176 See Evgenia V. Sorokina, Chile's Free Trade Agreements: Can Their Benefits Survive Chile's Continuing 
Controls on Foreign Capital?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2003).
177 JOHN HICKMAN, NEWS FROM THE END OF THE EARTH: A PORTRAIT OF CHILE 216 (1998).
178
 Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181
  See also Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1064 (2004) (“[T]he 
Southern Cone countries are now makers and not simply takers of international policy.”).
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ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
This theory appears to have more applicability than American hegemony. After all, 
the Americans were not actively interested in negotiating an FTA with Chile until 
after Chile had an FTA with the EU, which negatively affected American trade.182
Thus, while corporate lobbying over the FTA likely occurred in both countries, it 
does not appear that there was any concerted effort to lobby or present some type of 
“false hope” or misleading claim to either government. Instead, it seems that the 
interested and affected corporations and other parties of each respective country 
lobbied to further their inapposite corporate interests. 
The one “hope,” or effective lobbying that could be attributable to some multinational 
or large American corporation(s) is the FTA’s provision requiring capital market 
reforms to create increased foreign investment in Chile.183 However, this appears to 
have been something Chile recognized and has attempted to address using a variety of 
policies.184 Moreover, the increased liberalization of Chile’s capital market actually 
supports its policy of growing exports through the increased market access gained 
through the FTA.185 Thus, it does not appear that Chile agreed to this provision as a 
result of effective lobbying of some multinational corporation because medium sized 
Chilean corporations were greatly affected by Chile's current capital market 
regulatory structure. 186 Consequently, lobbying from affected corporate interests 
within its constituency seems to be the most likely influence on Chile’s acceptance of 
this provision, which is more akin to typical politics than geopolitical objectives 
driven by large corporate interests.
iii. Chile’s Autonomous Policy Implementation
It appears that the most likely explanation for Chile’s decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with 
the U.S. was to further its own interests. In light of Chile’s struggles in the 1970s and 80s, and its 
belief that its free market and trade liberalization policies have been a major reason for its recent 
182
 Aaron Schavey, How Trade Promotion Authority Would Bolster the Manufacturing Industry, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER NO. 1561 (June 21, 2002), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1561.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
183 See Chilean Government, Trade Policy Review, at 7 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
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 Evgenia V. Sorokina, Chile's Free Trade Agreements: Can Their Benefits Survive Chile's Continuing Controls 
on Foreign Capital? 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1217, 1228-29 (2003).
185 Id.
186 Id. (“[T]he brunt of protection against capitales golondrina is borne by Chilean companies, and in particular, by 
medium size companies that cannot raise cheaper capital to finance their operations and expansion.”).
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economic success, its desire to enter into a trade liberalization agreement with the U.S. appears  
consistent with this policy.187 In fact, it seems to further this policy.188
One can certainly argue that Chile’s economic policies are wrong or improperly developed, but 
Chile has certainly found stability and amazing success compared to other countries, especially 
in the past 15 years.189 Moreover, these policies are strongly supported by the country’s 
populace.190
In fact, Chile’s decision to enter into a bilateral FTA with the U.S. without really seeking to 
diminish American agricultural subsidies, a problem that greatly affects Chileans’ large farming 
industry, may even be a strategic negotiating decision. Currently, the FTAA has become bogged 
down due to an impasse over American agricultural subsidies, strengthening of IPRs, and other 
issues.191 Consequently, this FTA may be a decision by Chile to make more immediate and 
certain gains in the American market with the current FTA. This allows Chile to continue to 
address problems associated with American subsidies in the FTAA forum, where it may have 
greater success due to the presence of Brazil and other Mercorsur countries which, are largely 
responsible for the FTAA negotiation impasse.192 As these issues specifically relate to IPRs and 
agrarian subsidies, it is Brazil and Argentina that have the most to lose in granting stronger IPRs 
because both countries have relatively large generic pharmaceutical and agricultural 
industries.193 In contrast, Chile does not have substantial industries relying on IPRs and does not 
appear to be overly concerned with American farm subsidies, either because it is secretly hoping 
for Brazil’s success in FTAA negotiations or because it is not overly concerned with the long 
term effects of subsidies on Chilean products.194
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Consequently, it appears that Chile entered a bilateral FTA with the U.S. to further its own trade 
policies. Moreover, it does not appear that Chile has much concern with any potential problems 
stronger IPRs may present to its economic or technological development.195 This is likely due to 
Chile’s economy not having any relatively substantial industries that rely on intellectual property 
rights, like a pharmaceutical industry. Another explanation is that Chile hopes the FTA may 
increase the rate of transfer and dissemination of various technologies, which would either offset 
or be a net benefit when compared to any negative implications associated with granting stronger 
IPRs.196 Since Chile relies on exports to fill most of its manufacturing and technological needs, it 
is likely that technological transfer increases will increase its citizens well being without having 
many negative affects to its industrial interests.197
B. Australia
As compared to Chile’s fifteen year FTA negotiation process, it appears the U.S. was much more 
willing to negotiate with Australia. This seems surprising in light of many commentators’ claims 
that developed countries are less willing to be coerced by the U.S, which is allegedly why the 
U.S. does not entertain bilateral talks with many developed countries, specifically the EU.198 In 
contrast, it took a relatively short time to make a similar pact with Australia. This may be due to 
Australia having more accessible and experienced negotiators when talks were initiated, or it 
may be due to artificial or inherent prejudices American policy has with countries that do not 
share its Anglican heritage and language. However, as with Canada (but to a lesser extent), 
Australia is dependent upon the American market for a large amount of its agriculture and gold 
mining exports.199 Since these two industries are quite large, they obviously had a great impact 
on the political decision to acquiesce in an FTA that provided greater IPRs.200 Moreover, such an 
2005) and cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New  Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). Chile may feel American subsidies are more 
properly limited through regime change in the WTO or through the FTAA negotiation process.
195 Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 45, 54 (2003) (“Intellectual property systems designed for highly industrialized countries may actually hinder 
innovation relevant to developing countries”).
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agreement is consistent with recent Australian policies, which has focused on expanding its IPRs 
over the last few years.201 This is probably particularly true when considering Australia’s small 
entertainment and software industries.202 Moreover, because Australia has increasingly expanded 
its manufacturing industries over the past 10-15 years, the increased market access provides an 
avenue to create more and accelerating growth.203 Likewise, as with Chile, Australia relies 
heavily on American foreign investment. Thus, as with Chile, Australia had much to gain and 
little to lose in agreeing to expanding IPRs for greater foreign investment access.204
Australia was also concerned that less developed countries were becoming more competitive and 
gaining greater access to American markets as a direct result of FTAs with the U.S.205 Thus, it 
appears, at least in the case with Australia, that the less developed countries may be greatly 
impacting developed countries’ decisions in making bilateral agreements.206
More importantly, as with Chile, Australia considers its trade liberalization policies of the last 
15-20 years as being a major reason for its success in expanding its economy and growing its 
manufacturing and other industries. Thus, its agreement also reflects its population’s decision to 
continue implementing a policy that has been credited with greatly increasing its financial well 
being. Moreover, to most Australians, greater IPRs are likely to provide a negligible problem 
when compared to the positive impacts the FTA and stronger IPRs will have on Australia’s other 
industries.207
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1. Testing Hypotheses
i. U.S. Hegemony
It appears that U.S. negotiations with Australia went relatively smoothly. While Australia was 
willing to agree to stronger IPRs, it also gained the greater access to U.S. markets and foreign 
investment it desired. In lieu of the fact that Australia has relatively small IPR oriented 
industries, it appears Australia sacrificed very little to achieve its objectives.208
In agreeing to an FTA with the U.S., it seems Australia was reacting to various factors.209 The 
largest of these being increased competition in the American agricultural markets from FTAs the 
U.S. had made or was planning to make with various Latin and Central American countries.210
Australia was also concerned with recent anti-free trade actions, like the tariffs placed on 
American steel imports that did not come from countries the U.S. had some type of FTA with, 
and Australia’s desire to further its trade liberalization policies.211
Thus, it seems there could be some support for a U.S. coercion hypothesis in relation to Australia 
because of American anti-free trade tariffs and subsidies. However, the steel tariff was only 
transitory in nature and repealed after a WTO ruling invalidated the tariff fifteen months after it 
was created.212 Moreover, Australia was able to exempt its largest steel exporter, BHP Steel, 
from most of these tariffs.213 Thus, while this may have been an Australian concern, it appears 
that there were already avenues in place to deal with this issue and cannot adequately explain 
Australia’s desire for an FTA.
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Moreover, Australia felt it had adequate negotiating power.214 This feeling seems to be validated 
because business and political leaders seem, generally, very happy with the FTA.215
Consequently, it does not appear that Australia was really coerced into making this agreement. 
Instead, it appears Australia was more interested in making the agreement to further its own 
interests and maintain or increase U.S. attention in the Pacific region, which is another one of 
Australia’s policies.216
ii. Multinational Corporate Lobbying
This theory appears to have much more applicability to the Australian-U.S. FTA than it did for 
the Chilean-U.S. FTA. Some of the major proponents of this FTA were Alcoa, Kellogg’s, 
Caterpillar, IBM, and Mobil.217 Moreover, mining, metals, and manufacturing are expected to 
make the largest gains from the FTA for Australian industries.218 These results would clearly 
help Alcoa and Caterpillar.
However, the FTA signed by Australia and the U.S. appear to help a vast array of Australian 
business, especially agricultural interests, and its automotive industry.219 Consequently, it 
appears that Australia attempted to help all of its industries in making the FTA, not just large 
multinational corporations. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. was likely more willing to make 
concessions that could help companies that also do have a substantial business presence in the 
U.S. due to effective lobbying. However, the magnitude of this effect remains unclear. 
Moreover, the fact that this agreement increased Australian financial investment into the U.S. 
and will also help Australian firms of various sizes enter American markets indicates that the 
agreement was not aimed solely at multinational corporate interests.220
Thus, while multinational corporate interests were involved in the FTA negotiation process, it 
does not appear to have been the sole or even major aim of Australia in negotiating the 
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agreement.221 Instead, it appears Australia was much more interested in promoting Australian 
business interests, especially agricultural and mineral interests, which make up a large portion of 
Australia’s economy and exports.222
iii. Australian Autonomous Policy Implementation
It appears that, while there is some evidence of U.S. coercion or multinational corporation 
lobbying, the largest factor affecting Australian negotiations were indigenous Australian interests 
in furthering its trade liberalization policies and economic opportunities for principally 
Australian businesses.223  Australia is very committed to promoting economic policies that have 
proven successful to growing Australia’s economy, which essentially consist of trade 
liberalization policies.224 In fact, Australia is lowering its tariffs unilaterally through 2005 as part 
of this robust policy.225
Additionally, Australia has been committed to expanding IPRs. 226 Consequently, Australia’s 
decision to acquiesce to U.S. demands on expanding IPRs is consistent with this policy. 
Additionally, strengthening IPRs is unlikely to negatively affect Australia’s overall economy. 
Stronger IPRs will likely help Australia’s biotechnology industry, which is considered to be 
“world class.”227 However, the greater rights are expected to negatively affect Australia’s 
computer and technology industries.228 In spite of this negative impact, the FTA may have 
221
 Australian Industry Group, Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, at 2, (Feb. 7, 2004) 
http://www.austa.net/pdf/AIGfeb04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)(explaining that agricultural, mineral, and 
Australian automotive industry gains appear to be major winners from bilateral FTA negotiations. None of these 
industries, with the exception of minerals, involves extensive multinational corporate involvement that would be 
detrimental to Australian employment or business interests.).
222
 Federal Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, Australian Farmers to Reap Benefits from an FTA, 
(Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.maff.gov.au/releases/02/02321wt.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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 Australian Industry Group, Trade Access, Negotiating for Better Market Access, at 2, (Feb. 7, 2004), 
http://www.austa.net/pdf/AIGfeb04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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 Australian Government, Trade Policy Review Body: Australia, (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.wto.org (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005).
225 Id.
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 Bruce Rasmussen, An Analysis of the Biomedical Sectors in  Australia and Canada in a National Innovation 
Systems Context, at 7 (July, 2004), http://www.cfses.com/pharma/documents/21-
Biomedical_Sect_Aust_&_Can_Innovation_Rasmussen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) compare with Australian 
Trade Commission, Biotechnology Capability Overview, (Nov. 11, 2004), 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/overseas/layout/0,,0_S3-1_-2_-3_PWB1108372-4_-5_-6_-7_,00.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2005) (explaining that Australia considers its Biotech industry, while relatively small, to be an “emerging” one.) 
and Australian Trade Commission, Film Capability Overview, (Nov. 11, 2004),
http://www.austrade.gov.au/overseas/layout/0%2C%2C0_S3-1_3zo-2_-3_PWB1109329-4_-5_-6_-7_%2C00.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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created a sufficiently substantial net benefit to Australian commerce that it was willing to risk 
negatively affecting this relatively small segment of Australia’s economy.229
C. Implications of These Results
1. Bilateral vs. Multilateral
It would appear that the success Chile had in its bilateral negotiations, especially when compared 
to the highly unfavorable results attributable to the multilateral TRIPS negotiations, suggest that 
the best forum for less developed countries are bilateral negotiations.230 This probably allows 
each country to fully analyze the claims made by its trading partner and discern which are “false 
hopes” and which are not. This is particularly true when the negotiators are highly capable, 
which appears to be the case in some less developed countries like Chile or Brazil.231
It appears that a multilateral setting may not be necessary, and is likely even harmful to less 
developed countries’ interests during any negotiation process. Thus, these countries are probably 
better off using bilateral negotiations or negotiations between one developed country and a group 
of less developed countries, similar to the FTAA negotiations.232 This would provide a less 
overwhelming forum that is less likely to be coordinated by a vast array of powerful special 
interests that are capable of separating any cohesion that may exist between the less developed 
countries’ negotiation tactics or strategy.233
2. NGO Involvement
These results appear to impact some aspects of the current commentary regarding NGO 
involvement in intergovernmental negotiations.234 Specifically, the notion that NGOs should be 
http:// www.aimia.com.au/i-cms_file?page=533/AIMIA_FTA_Preso_Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Dr. 
Andrew Tridgell, FTA Disastrous for Australian Computer Industry and Users, (July, 2004), 
http://samba.org/~tridge/fta_statement.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
229 Allen Consulting Group, The Economic Contribution of Australia’s Copyright Industries, at ii-iii (2001) 
available at: http://www.copyright.com.au/reports%20&%20papers/(c)_Value.pdf  (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) 
(explaining that Australia’s copyright industries combine to comprise 3.3% of Australia’s GDP. Moreover, Australia 
is a net importer of copyright materials by over $1 billion.).
230
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the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1051-52 (2004).
232 Compare Id. with Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 850 (2003).
233 See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO; Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 819, 850 (2003).
234 See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protestors into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective 
Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 937, 987 (2003) (“NGOs can put a human face 
on the WTO. However, like the humans the NGOs represent, they need to be included.”); see generally, Erik B. 
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involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations would appear to make little sense if less 
developed countries are capable negotiators that ably negotiate their population’s best interests. 
Moreover, when dealing with democratically elected officials, it seems unnecessary to involve 
parties that have no constituency or concrete interest in the results of the negotiations. If the 
population doesn’t agree with its government’s policies, it votes for a change; this is particularly 
true for bilateral negotiations, where each countries’ interested parties have the loudest voices in 
whether policies or tradeoffs are acceptable.235 What positive influence NGOs could have in this 
environment appear to be minimal, unless another barrier to finding mutually agreeable terms is 
considered a positive influence on a negotiation process.236 Moreover, it is unlikely NGOs would 
somehow be less corruptible than government officials, particularly because these groups lack 
any connection to some elected constituency.237 Thus, even if NGOs are given a place at the 
Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Analyzing TRIPS Participatory Guarantees in Light of Protected Indigenous 
Rights, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 671 (2004) and Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS 
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 50 n.227 
(2004).
235
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236See Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 933, 949 (2003). (explaining that WIPO 
gets about 85-90% of its operating budget from Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications, which are mostly 
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237 Cf. The lack of transparency or constituency that most bureaucrat UN employees represent creates an 
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2005, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/international/04food.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005)
 (Reaction to the report from Congressional investigators was mostly supportive of Mr. Volcker’s 
work. Representative Henry J. Hyde, the Illinois Republican who is the chairman of the House 
International Relations Committee, said in a statement that the report painted a picture of 
‘mismanagement, neglect and political manipulation that resulted in significant corruption of the 
oil-for-food program.' 'I am reluctant to conclude that the U.N. is damaged beyond repair,’ he said, 
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http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/5541377.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (“It's difficult to escape the 
34
negotiation table, lacking a constituency and clear accountability, it is uncertain that they will 
have a positive influence.238
However, for autocratic or communist governments, such NGO involvement likely wouldn’t 
present the same problems because these governments are less likely to be invoking policies 
favorable to the majority of its population, or for the greater good. Instead, these governments 
are more likely to be corrupt and more likely to benefit the empowered at the expense of their 
populations.239 Thus, in these instances, NGOs, particularly NGOs that are focused on increasing 
trap of those (NGO) people; they use the food as bait to get you to sex with them.") and Joseph Loconte, The U.N. 
Sex Scandal, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 10, 2005,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/081zxelz.asp?pg=1 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005)
(The sexual abuses committed, or ignored, by U.N. personnel violate the institution's Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, and the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A 
2002 U.N. report characterized the sexual exploitation issue as ‘a betrayal of trust as well as a 
catastrophic failure of protection.’), 
and Mark Steyn, U.N. Forces? Just a Bunch of Thugs, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 2005, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;sessionid=EWMD2C5GC5G1PQFIQMFSM5OAVCBQ0JVC?xml=
/opinion/2005/02/15/do1502.xml&sSheet=/opinion/2005/02/15/ixopinion.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) 
(All this derives from a UN culture in which the free nations have met the thug states so much 
more than half way that they now largely share the dictators' view of their peoples - as either 
helpless children who need every decision made for them, or a bunch of dupes whose national 
wealth you can reroute to your Swiss bank account, or a never-ending source of fresh meat.),
with Secretary-General of United Nations Security Council Report, Children and Armed Conflict, (Sept. 7, 2001),
www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/KeyDocuments/Printable/Report/A-56-342-S-2001-
852English.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) 
(I sincerely hope that Member States, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations, 
civil society and others will take decisive action to protect children and to actively dissuade, and 
seek to expose and sanction, those whose actions are beyond the pale. This is a matter of 
international cooperation and political will, and it is my hope that concrete commitments will be 
made by the Security Council and Member States such that all parties to armed conflict, and actors 
whose conduct indirectly fuels conflict, cannot but realize that the international community will 
accept nothing less than full compliance with child protection obligations and commitments in 
time of war and in its aftermath.).
238 See Gregory F. Jacob, Perspectives: Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 287, 297 (2004) 
(…NGOs exert tremendous influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right 
on matters of substance, but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services 
available to delegates with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly 
did not act as disinterested legal advisers, and along the way more than one delegation was 
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cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 88 (2003)
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239 See Pavol Stracansky, Corruption in Eastern Europe: Communism Leaves a Long Hangover, (Nov. 4, 2004),
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the financial well being and freedoms of the unrepresented, could provide a necessary voice that 
is inherently present during negotiations between democratic countries in a bilateral setting, but 
missing in negotiations with tyrannical or communist countries.240 Moreover, even if these 
groups were corrupted or corruptible, it would be little different than what is already likely to be 
the case with a communist or tyrannical government.241
VI. Conclusion
As this case study illustrates, less developed countries are not as unsophisticated as many may 
have claimed when negotiating FTAs that may provide for stronger IPRs. Instead, it appears that 
the internal political capacity and stability of each country are the determinative factors of 
whether a country is capable of adequately representing itself in such negotiations.242 Thus, the 
willingness and likelihood of a less developed country with a democratic government entering an 
FTA providing stronger IPRs is likely to be directly related to the substantial industrial interests 
or constituency of each country.243
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243 See Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 
and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1051-52 (2004); cf. JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 32 (2003) (explaining how Ethiopia rejected IMF funding and 
demands due to its concerns with the negative impacts the IMF demands would have on their farming industry.).
